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Abstract
We develop a single-period model for a large economic agent who
trades with market makers at their utility indifference prices. We com-
pute the sensitivities of these market indifference prices with respect
to the size of the investor’s order. It turns out that the price impact
of an order is determined both by the market makers’ joint risk toler-
ance and by the variation of individual risk tolerances. On a technical
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level, a key role in our analysis is played by a pair of conjugate saddle
functions associated with the description of Pareto optimal allocations
in terms of the aggregate utility function.
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1 Introduction
Most models studied in Mathematical Finance specify price dynamics ex-
ogenously, e.g., by some semi-martingale which satisfies certain economically
sensible conditions, most notably the absence of arbitrage opportunities, and
whose behavior is not affected by an investor’s trading strategy. While being
linear with respect to the order flow and therefore convenient to analyze, such
models inevitably ignore the fundamental economic principle that prices are
formed by demand and supply. This idealization is justified from a practical
viewpoint as long as the trading volume remains small enough to be easily
covered by market liquidity. But when transactions involve a sizable part of
‘the market’ for a security, a model for their impact on asset prices is clearly
called for.
It is the purpose of this paper and its companion [5] to systematically de-
velop such a price impact model in, respectively, a one-period and a continuous-
time framework. Of course, price impact models have been proposed before
with different goals in mind and we refer to the survey by Go¨kay et al.
[18] for a more detailed overview. For instance, Almgren and Chriss [1]
and Schied and Scho¨neborn [30] seek to find optimal execution strategies for
selling a large quantity of shares, while Frey and Stremme [15], Platen and
Schweizer [27], Papanicolaou and Sircar [26] and Cvitanic´ and Ma [11] as well
as C¸etin et al. [10] focus on option pricing in illiquid markets. The impact
of transactions on asset prices in their models is typically specified explicitly,
in a mathematically convenient form, but not derived systematically from
equilibrium-based considerations of economic theory.
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There is a vast literature on price formation in economics and we refer
to Amihud et al. [2], Biais et al. [9] and O’Hara [25] for surveys of financial
models with price impact. As in the model of Stoll [31], also in our framework
prices are quoted by some market makers and the price impact is due to their
risk aversion against growing inventories of risky securities. In line with the
utility based valuation methods common in mathematical finance, we add the
feature that our market makers can hedge against the incurred risk by trading
freely among themselves. We argue that, due to competition, this hedging
opportunity leads to more favorable quotes for the proposed transaction and
in fact eventually leaves every market maker indifferent between the pre- and
the post-transaction allocation of wealth.
We develop a mathematical framework for the analysis of these market
indifference prices. The key tool in our study is the convex duality theory
for saddle functions as presented by Rockafellar [29]. This allows us, for
instance, to compute the asymptotic expansion of market indifference prices
with respect to the order size. It turns out that these expansions have a
component which can be described in terms of a representative agent’s risk
aversion and another component which reflects the diversity of risk aversions
among the market makers.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we give the mathemat-
ical specification of our model and continue the discussion of its economic
features and some of the pertaining literature. In this section we also obtain
a basic result on the existence and uniqueness of market indifference prices.
A detailed study of these prices including the computation of their sensitiv-
ities with respect the order size constitutes our main result and is presented
in Section 4. This analysis relies on a number of technical facts related to
the classical parametrization of Pareto optimal allocations in terms of the
aggregate utility function. They are collected in Section 3.
2 Model
We consider a single-period financial model with initial time 0 and maturity 1
where M ∈ {1, 2, . . .} market makers quote prices for J ∈ {1, 2, . . .} traded
assets. These assets are specified through their payoffs ψ = (ψ1, . . . , ψJ) at
time 1 which are random variables defined on a complete probability space
(Ω,F ,P). As usual, we identify random variables differing on a set of mea-
sure zero and use the notations L0(Rd), for the metric space of such equiva-
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lence classes with values in Rd and convergence in probability, and Lp(Rd),
p ≥ 1, for the Banach space of p-integrable random variables.
The way the market makers serve the incoming orders crucially depends
on their attitude toward risk, which we model in the classical framework of
expected utility. Thus, we interpret the probability measure P as a descrip-
tion of the common beliefs of our market makers (same for all, for simplicity)
and denote by um = (um(x))x∈R market maker m’s utility function for ter-
minal wealth.
Assumption 2.1. Each um = um(x), m = 1, . . . ,M , is a strictly concave,
strictly increasing, continuously differentiable, and bounded above function
on the real line R satisfying
(2.1) lim
x→∞
um(x) = 0.
The normalization to zero in (2.1) is added only for notational conve-
nience. Many of our results will be derived under the following additional
condition on the utility functions, which, in particular, implies their bound-
edness from above.
Assumption 2.2. Each utility function um = um(x), m = 1, . . . ,M , is
twice continuously differentiable and its absolute risk aversion coefficient is
bounded away from zero and infinity, that is, for some c > 0,
(2.2)
1
c
≤ am(x) , −
u′′m(x)
u′m(x)
≤ c, x ∈ R.
The prices quoted by the market makers are also influenced by their initial
endowments α0 = (α
m
0 )m=1,...,M ∈ L
0(RM), where αm0 is an F -measurable
random variable describing the terminal wealth of the mth market maker if
no orders have to be filled. We assume that the initial allocation α0 is Pareto
optimal, that is, there is no strictly better re-allocation of the same resources
in the sense of the following well-known
Definition 2.3. A vector ofF -measurable random variables α = (αm)m=1,...,M
is called a Pareto optimal allocation if
(2.3) E[|um(α
m)|] <∞, m = 1, . . . ,M,
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and if there is no other allocation β ∈ L0(RM) with the same total endow-
ment,
M∑
m=1
βm =
M∑
m=1
αm,
which leaves all market makers not worse and at least one of them better off
in the sense that
E[um(β
m)] ≥ E[um(α
m)] for all m = 1, . . . ,M,
and
E[um(β
m)] > E[um(α
m)] for some m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} .
Suppose that at time 0 the market makers fill an order from a large
investor for the quantity q ∈ RJ of the assets ψ ∈ L0(RJ). As a result, the
market makers’ total endowment changes from Σ0 ,
∑M
m=1 α
m
0 to
Σ(x, q) , Σ0 + x+ 〈q, ψ〉 = Σ0 + x+
J∑
j=1
qjψj,
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the Euclidean scalar product and x ∈ R and q ∈ RJ
stand for, respectively, the cash amount and the number of assets acquired
by the market makers. Our model will assume that Σ(x, q) is re-allocated
among the market makers in the form of a Pareto optimal allocation. For
this to be possible we have to impose
Assumption 2.4. For any x ∈ R and q ∈ RJ there is an allocation β ∈
L0(RM) with the total endowment Σ(x, q) such that
(2.4) E[um(β
m)] > −∞, m = 1, . . . ,M.
Remark 2.5. Under Assumption 2.1, Lemma 3.2 below shows that Assump-
tion 2.4 is equivalent to the finiteness of the aggregate expected utility. Un-
der Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, Lemma 3.4 proves that Assumption 2.4 is also
equivalent to the existence of all exponential moments for ψ under the pricing
measure Q0 associated with the initial Pareto optimal allocation α0.
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2.1 Market indifference prices
Theorem 2.6 below identifies uniquely both the transaction price x = x(q)
associated with an order q and the market makers’ post-transaction allocation
of wealth α1 = α1(q) under the following two conditions:
Pareto optimality: The random endowment Σ(x, q) is redistributed be-
tween the market makers to form a new Pareto optimal allocation α1.
Utility indifference: The market makers’ expected utilities do not change:
(2.5) E[um(α
m
1 )] = E[um(α
m
0 )], m = 1, . . . ,M.
We postpone the discussion of the economic motivation behind these two con-
ditions until Section 2.2. By analogy with the popular utility-based valuation
method in mathematical finance, we call x = x(q) the market indifference
price of the order q.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, every position q ∈ RJ yields
a unique cash amount x = x(q) and a unique Pareto optimal allocation α1 =
α1(q) of Σ(x, q) preserving the market makers’ expected utilities in the sense
of (2.5).
Proof. For a real number y denote by B(y) the family of allocations β =
(βm)m=1,...,M with total endowment less than Σ(y, q) and such that
E[um(β
m)] ≥ E[um(α
m
0 )], m = 1, . . . ,M.
By Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, this set is non-empty for sufficiently large y and,
by the concavity of utility functions, is a convex subset of L0(RM). Denote
ŷ , inf {y ∈ R : B(y) 6= ∅} ,
let (yn)n≥1 be a strictly decreasing sequence of real numbers converging to ŷ,
and arbitrarily choose βn ∈ B(yn), n ≥ 1.
From Assumption 2.1 we deduce the existence of c > 0 such that, for
m = 1, . . . ,M ,
y− ≤ c(−um(y)), y ∈ R,
where y− , max(0,−y); for example, we can take
c = 1/ min
m=1,...,M
u′m(0).
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It follows that
E[(βmn )
−)] ≤ cE[(−um(β
m
n ))] ≤ cE[(−um(α
m
0 ))] <∞, n ≥ 1,
and, therefore, the sequence ((βn)
−)n≥1 is bounded in L
1(RM). Since, in
addition,
M∑
m=1
βmn ≤ Σ(yn, q) ≤ Σ(y1, q),
the family of all possible convex combinations of (βn)n≥1 is bounded in
L0(RM).
By Lemma A1.1 in [13] we can then choose convex combinations ζn of
(βk)k≥n, n ≥ 1, which converge almost surely to a random variable ζ ∈
L0(RM). Clearly,
(2.6)
M∑
m=1
ζm ≤ Σ(ŷ, q).
Since the utility functions are bounded from above, Fatou’s lemma yields
(2.7) E[um(ζ
m)] ≥ lim sup
n→∞
E[um(ζ
m
n )] ≥ E[um(α
m
0 )],
where the second estimate holds because ζn ∈ B(yn) by the convexity of
B(yn). It follows that ζ ∈ B(ŷ). The minimality of ŷ then immediately
implies the equalities in (2.6) and (2.7) and the Pareto optimality of ζ . Hence,
we can select x = ŷ and α1 = ζ , thus proving their existence.
Finally, the uniqueness of x and α1 follows from the strict concavity of
utility functions.
The preceding proof yields immediately that the market indifference price
x(q) is minimal in the following sense:
Corollary 2.7. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, the market indifference
price x(q) associated with an order q ∈ RJ is the minimal amount x ∈ R
for which there exists an allocation β ∈ L0(RM) with the total wealth Σ(x, q)
such that
E[um(β
m)] ≥ E[um(α
m
0 )], m = 1, . . . ,M.
In Section 4 we show in detail how the market indifference price x =
x(q) : RJ → R and the Pareto allocations α1 = α1(q) : R
J → L0(RM)
determined by Theorem 2.6 depend on the order q of the large investor.
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2.2 Economic considerations
Let us next discuss the scope and limitations of our model as well as its
relation to other models proposed in the literature. The book by O’Hara [25]
as well as the surveys by Amihud et al. [2] and by Biais et al. [9] provide an
extensive overview of the economic background.
Like in the work of Stoll [31] and Ho and Stoll [20] also in our model the
market makers’ quotes depend on the inventory they hold. The first distinc-
tive feature of our setup is the assumption that the market makers share their
risk in a Pareto optimal way. Since Pareto optimal allocations of wealth can
be achieved, essentially, only in complete markets, we are implicitly postu-
lating that, besides the publicly traded assets ψ, the market makers can also
trade any arbitrarily structured product among themselves. In other words,
they have a complete ‘over the counter market’ at their disposal. It would
be interesting to obtain conditions under which this auxiliary market can be
dispensed with and the desired completeness property is achieved endoge-
nously by trading only the primary securities ψ. In this respect, we mention
the works by Anderson and Raimondo [3], Hugonnier et al. [21], Riedel and
Herzberg [28], Kramkov [22] on the existence of an endogenously complete
Arrow-Radner equilibrium.
As a second key condition we assume that the market makers are indif-
ferent between their pre- and post-transaction allocations of wealth. Given
the existence of a complete market at their disposal, this can be viewed as
a consequence of a Bertrand-style competition among them. Indeed, on one
hand Corollary 2.7 shows that there is no way to trade q securities at a trans-
action price less than x(q) if no market maker is to loose in terms of expected
utility. On the other hand, if one of the market makers could fill the order q
at a price x > x(q) she could subsequently use a small part of the difference
x−x(q) to offer attractive deals to her fellow market makers on the over the
counter market, e.g., by topping up the utility preserving allocation α1(q)
of Theorem 2.6. Plainly, all market makers would like to proceed this way.
Following the usual Bertrand competition argument, this leads to a limiting
quote of the market indifference price x(q) and all the market makers end
up being indifferent between the pre- and the post-transaction allocation of
wealth. It may be interesting to note that the market indifference price x(q)
is smaller than every of the market makers’ reservation prices xm(q) defined
by
E[um(α
m
0 + xm(q) + 〈q, ψ〉)] = E[um(α
m
0 )], m = 1, . . . ,M.
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This follows directly from Corollary 2.7 and is due to the market makers’
ability to improve their positions by trading with each other.
There are, of course, several idealizations in our model. For instance, it
assumes that all trades between the market markers are completed instantly
after the transaction with the large investor. But in real markets it may take
time to find counterparties for a hedge and it may be impossible to negotiate
with them the best possible deals. Hence, to compensate for risks emerging
from these frictions, real market makers will ask for a risk premium and
for compensation of their operational costs both of which are not included
in our transaction price; see Grossman and Miller [19], Duffie et al. [14],
Longstaff [24] and the references therein. Another idealization is that the
market makers do not act strategically. In particular, they do not account
for adverse selection effects as studied, e.g., by Kyle [23], Back [4], Glosten
and Milgrom [17], Biais et al. [8].
As pointed out by Bernhardt and Hughson [7] the utility indifference may
not hold when, by contrast to our setting, orders can be split and market
makers quote price schedules which have to be honored independently from
the fellow market makers and when hedging opportunities are not taken
into account. Our model is different from the one in Garleanu et al. [16]
where a representative market maker maximizes utility from consumption
and where prices are determined so that her optimal position matches some
exogenously given demand for marketed assets. Our market makers also do
not exert market power as investigated, e.g., in the work of Weretka [32].
While it would certainly be desirable to account for all these various aspects
of market microstructure, this is clearly beyond the scope of a single paper.
3 Parametrization of Pareto allocations
The analysis of market indifference prices in Section 4 relies on the parametriza-
tion of Pareto allocations stated, in our setting, in Theorem 3.1 below. This
parametrization is well-known; see, e.g., Dana and Le Van [12] for a similar
result.
Recall that the aggregate utility function is defined as
(3.1) r(v, x) , sup
x1+···+xM=x
M∑
m=1
vmum(x
m), v ∈ (0,∞)M , x ∈ R.
One can show, see, e.g., Theorem 3.1 of [6], that under Assumption 2.1
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r = r(v, x) is a continuously differentiable saddle function, strictly convex
and decreasing in v ∈ (0,∞)M and strictly concave and increasing in x ∈ R.
Moreover, for any (v, x) ∈ (0,∞)M ×R, the supremum in (3.1) is attained
at the vector x̂ = (x̂m)m=1,...,M ∈ R
M uniquely determined by
vmu′m(x̂
m) =
∂r
∂x
(v, x),(3.2)
or, equivalently, by
um(x̂
m) =
∂r
∂vm
(v, x), m = 1, . . . ,M.(3.3)
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumption 2.1, the following statements are equiva-
lent for every Σ ∈ L0(R):
1. The allocation α = (αm)m=1,...,M of Σ is Pareto optimal.
2. The random variables α = (αm)m=1,...,M satisfy the integrability condi-
tion (2.3) and there is a a vector v ∈ (0,∞)M such that
(3.4) vmu′m(α
m) =
∂r
∂x
(v,Σ), m = 1, . . . ,M.
Moreover, such a vector v is defined uniquely up to a scalar multiple.
Proof. Denote by B = B(Σ) the family of allocations β ∈ L0(RM) with the
total endowment
∑M
m=1 β
m = Σ such that
E[um(βm)] > −∞, m = 1, . . . ,M.
1 =⇒ 2: The integrability condition (2.3) for α holds by the definition
of a Pareto optimal allocation. By the concavity of the utility functions, the
set
C ,
{
z ∈ RM : zm ≤ E[um(β
m)], m = 1, . . . ,M, for some β ∈ B
}
is convex and, by the Pareto optimality of α, the point
ẑm , E[um(α
m)], m = 1 . . . ,M,
belongs to the boundary of C. Hence, there is a non-zero v ∈ RM such that
〈v, ẑ〉 ≥ 〈v, z〉 , z ∈ C,
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or, equivalently,
E[
M∑
m=1
vmum(α
m)] = sup
β∈B
E[
M∑
m=1
vmum(β
m)] = E[r(v,Σ)].
As v 6= 0, the properties of the utility functions in Assumption 2.1 imply
that v ∈ (0,∞)M . By (3.2), the fact that the upper bound above is attained
at α is equivalent to (3.4).
2 =⇒ 1: By the definition of r = r(v, x), for every β ∈ B
M∑
m=1
vmum(β
m) ≤ r(v,Σ) =
M∑
m=1
vmum(α
m).
Given the integrability requirement (2.3), this clearly implies the Pareto op-
timality of α.
Finally, we note that (3.4) determines v uniquely up to a scalar multiple.
It is common to normalize the Pareto weight v from Theorem 3.1 by
restricting it to the set
SM ,
{
w ∈ (0, 1)M :
M∑
m=1
wm = 1
}
,
the interior of the simplex; such a v ∈ SM is defined uniquely.
The following result allows us to parametrize the Pareto allocations in
our economy by the set
(3.5) A , (0,∞)M ×R×RJ ,
Lemma 3.2. Let Assumption 2.1 hold. Then Assumption 2.4 is equivalent
to
(3.6) E[r(v,Σ(x, q))] > −∞, (v, x, q) ∈ A.
In this case, for a = (v, x, q) ∈ A, the random vector pi(a) ∈ L0(RM)
defined by
(3.7) vmu′m(pi
m(a)) =
∂r
∂x
(v,Σ(x, q)), m = 1, . . . ,M,
forms a Pareto optimal allocation. Conversely, for (x, q) ∈ R × RJ , any
Pareto allocation of the total endowment Σ(x, q) is given by (3.7) for some
v ∈ (0,∞)M .
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Proof. Under Assumption 2.4, there is an allocation β = (βm)m=1,...,M of
Σ(x, q) satisfying (2.4). Since,
M∑
m=1
vmum(β
m) ≤ r(v,Σ(x, q)) ≤ 0,
we obtain (3.6).
Assume now that (3.6) holds. By (3.2), the condition (3.7) is equivalent
to
M∑
m=1
vmum(pi
m(a)) = r(v,Σ(x, q)).
As vm > 0 and um < 0,m = 1, . . . ,M , we deduce from (3.6) that um(pi
m(a)) ∈
L1, m = 1, . . . ,M , which, in particular, yields Assumption 2.4. The Pareto
optimality of pi(a) is now an immediate corollary of Theorem 3.1.
Finally, the fact that any Pareto allocation of Σ(x, q) is given by (3.7),
for some v ∈ (0,∞)M , follows from Theorem 3.1.
In view of the equivalence of (3.2) and (3.3), the Pareto allocation pi(a)
can also be defined by
(3.8) um(pi
m(a)) =
∂r
∂vm
(v,Σ(x, q)), m = 1, . . . ,M.
A well-known interpretation of the condition (3.7) for the Pareto alloca-
tion pi(a) is that our market makers agree on the valuation of marginal trades.
The existence of the corresponding pricing measure Q(a) is established in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, for any a = (v, x, q) ∈ A,
there is a probability measure Q(a) such that
(3.9)
dQ(a)
dP
=
∂r
∂x
(v,Σ(x, q))
E[ ∂r
∂x
(v,Σ(x, q))]
=
u′m(pi
m(a))
E[u′m(pi
m(a))]
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
where pi(a) = (pim(a))m=1,...,M is the Pareto optimal allocation defined in
(3.7).
Proof. In view of Lemma 3.2 it is sufficient to verify that
E[
∂r
∂x
(v,Σ(x, q))] <∞.
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This follows from (3.6) and the inequality
∂r
∂x
(v,Σ(x, q)) ≤ r(v,Σ(x, q))− r(v,Σ(x− 1, q)),
which holds by the concavity of r(v, ·).
We conclude this section with another equivalent re-formulation of As-
sumption 2.4, this time, in terms of an exponential moment condition for ψ
under the initial pricing measure Q0.
Lemma 3.4. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 the pricing measure Q0 of the
initial Pareto allocation α0 = (α
m
0 )m=1,...,M is well-defined by
dQ0
dP
=
u′m(α
m
0 )
E[u′m(α
m
0 )]
, m = 1, . . . ,M.
and Assumption 2.4 is equivalent to the existence of all exponential moments
of ψ = (ψj)j=1,...,J under Q0:
(3.10) EQ0[e
z|ψ|] <∞, z ∈ R.
Proof. Observe first that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 imply that
(3.11)
1
c
≤ −
u′m(x)
um(x)
≤ c, x ∈ R, m = 1, . . . ,M,
with the same constant c > 0 as in (2.2). From this and (3.2) we deduce that
M
c
∂r
∂x
(v, x) ≤ −r(v, x) ≤ cM
∂r
∂x
(v, x), (v, x) ∈ (0,∞)M ×R,
and, therefore,
−r(v, x+ y) ≥
M
c
∂r
∂x
(v, x) exp
(
1
cM
y− −
c
M
y+
)
,
−r(v, x+ y) ≤ cM
∂r
∂x
(v, x) exp
(
c
M
y− −
1
cM
y+
)
,
(3.12)
where y+ , max(y, 0) and y− , max(−y, 0).
For Q0 to be well-defined we have to verify that
E[u′m(α
m
0 )] <∞, m = 1, . . . ,M.
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This follows from (3.11) and the inequality
E[um(α
m
0 )] > −∞, m = 1, . . . ,M,
which holds by the definition of a Pareto optimal allocation.
Let v0 ∈ (0,∞)
M denote a Pareto weight of α0 from Theorem 3.1. The
positive homogeneity and the monotonicity properties of r(·, x) imply the
equivalence of (3.6) and
E[r(v0,Σ(x, q))] > −∞, (x, q) ∈ R×R
J ,
which by (3.12) and the definition of Q0 is, in turn, equivalent to (3.10).
4 Analysis of market indifference prices
The construction of market indifference prices in Theorem 2.6 does not di-
rectly allow for an analysis of how these prices actually depend on the order
the market makers’ are assumed to fill. We thus develop in Section 4.1 be-
low a quantitative description of these prices. Indeed, Theorem 4.1 shows
in particular that the market indifference price and the associated Pareto
allocation can be computed from the saddle conjugate of the representative
market maker’s expected utility. Theorem 4.2 then computes the second or-
der derivatives of market indifference prices and the sensitivity of their Pareto
allocations with respect to the order size. Section 4.2 then uses these to pro-
vide asymptotic expansions of market indifference prices which reveal their
dependence on the market makers’ individual and aggregate risk tolerances.
4.1 Quantitative description of market indifference prices
A key role in our study of market indifference prices will be played by the
pair of conjugate saddle functions
F0(a) , E[r(v,Σ(x, q))], a = (v, x, q) ∈ A,
G0(b) , sup
v∈(0,∞)M
inf
x∈R
[〈v, u〉+ xy − F0(v, x, q)], b = (u, y, q) ∈ B,
where r = r(v, x), the aggregate utility function, and A, the parameter set
of Pareto allocations, are defined in (3.1) and (3.5), and
B , (−∞, 0)M × (0,∞)×RJ .
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These functions represent the initial values of the stochastic fields F =
(F0, F1) and G = (G0, G1); the terminal values are given by
F1(a) , r(v,Σ(x, q)), a = (v, x, q) ∈ A,
G1(b) , sup
v∈(0,∞)M
inf
x∈R
[〈v, u〉+ xy − F1(v, x, q)], b = (u, y, q) ∈ B.
The stochastic fields F and G are thoroughly studied in our companion paper
[6] under Assumption 2.1 and the condition:
F0(a) = E[r(v,Σ(x, q))] > −∞, a = (v, x, q) ∈ A,
which, by Lemma 3.2, is equivalent to Assumption 2.4.
Theorem 4.1 in [6] describes in detail the properties of the sample paths
of the stochastic fields F and G. In particular, the functions F0 and G0 are
continuously differentiable, and the derivatives of F0 can be computed by
taking expectations of the corresponding derivatives of F1:
(4.1)
∂F0
∂ai
(a) = E[
∂F1
∂ai
(a)], a ∈ A.
Moreover, Theorem 2.2 in [6] shows that, for every fixed q ∈ RJ , the fol-
lowing conjugacy relationships between (v, x) ∈ (0,∞)M × R and (u, y) ∈
(−∞, 0)M × (0,∞) are equivalent:
1. We have x = ∂G0
∂y
(u, y, q) = G0(u, 1, q) and v =
∂G0
∂u
(u, y, q).
2. We have y = ∂F0
∂x
(v, x, q) and u = ∂F0
∂v
(v, x, q).
In addition, in this case,
(4.2)
∂G0
∂q
(u, y, q) = −
∂F0
∂q
(v, x, q).
For a ∈ A, recall the notations pi(a) and Q(a) for the Pareto allocation
and the pricing measure from (3.7) and (3.9), respectively. Also recall that
SM denotes the interior of the simplex in RM . The following result improves
Theorem 2.6.
Theorem 4.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.4, for every position q ∈ RJ
there is a unique cash amount x(q) and a unique Pareto optimal allocation
α1(q) with total endowment Σ(x(q), q) such that
(4.3) Um0 , E[um(α
m
0 )] = E[um(α
m
1 (q))], m = 1, . . . ,M.
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The Pareto optimal allocation α1(q) has the form
(4.4) α1(q) = pi(a(q)), a(q) = (w(q), x(q), q),
where the weights w(q) ∈ SM and the cash amount x(q) ∈ R are given by
wm(q) =
∂G0
∂um
(U0, 1, q)/
M∑
k=1
∂G0
∂uk
(U0, 1, q), m = 1, . . . ,M.(4.5)
x(q) = G0(U0, 1, q).(4.6)
The function x = x(q) : RJ → R is convex, continuously differentiable, and,
for q ∈ RJ ,
(4.7)
∂x
∂qj
(q) = −EQ(a(q))[ψ
j ], j = 1, . . . ,M.
Proof. The uniqueness of the cash amount and of the Pareto optimal alloca-
tion with the desired properties follows directly from the definition of Pareto
optimality and the strict concavity of utility functions.
For the existence, consider the cash amount x(q), the weights w(q), and
the Pareto optimal allocation α1(q) defined by (4.4)–(4.6). Clearly, by the
construction of the random field pi = pi(a), the total endowment of α1(q)
equals Σ(x(q), q). Denoting
v(q) ,
∂G0
∂um
(U0, 1, q) and a˜(q) , (v(q), x(q), q),
we deduce from the equivalence of items 1 and 2 above that
Um0 =
∂F0
∂vm
(a˜(q)), m = 1, . . . ,M,
1 =
∂F0
∂x
(a˜(q)),
and then from (4.2) that
∂G0
∂qj
(U0, 1, q) = −
∂F0
∂qj
(a˜(q)), j = 1, . . . , J.
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Accounting for (4.1) and the constructions of pi(a) and Q(a) in (3.8) and (3.9)
we obtain
Um0 = E[
∂r
∂vm
(v(q),Σ(x(q), q))] = E[um(pi
m(a˜(q))],
1 = E[
∂r
∂x
(v(q),Σ(x(q), q))],
∂G0
∂qj
(U0, 1, q) = −E[
∂r
∂x
(v(q),Σ(x(q), q))ψj] = −EQ(a˜(q))[ψ
j].
As w(q) is a scalar multiple of v(q), we have pi(a(q)) = pi(a˜(q)) and Qa(q) =
Qa˜(q) and the equalities (4.3) and (4.7) follow.
Finally, the convexity and the continuous differentiability of x = x(q)
follow from (4.6) and the properties of G0 given in Theorem 4.1 in [6].
Hereafter, we denote by x = x(q) : RJ → R and w = w(q) : RJ →
SM the market indifference price and the weights of the post-trade Pareto
allocation defined by (4.6) and (4.5), respectively. The sensitivity analysis of
these maps is accomplished in Theorem 4.2 below, whose formulation requires
us to introduce extra notations.
From now on, we also work under Assumption 2.2. We define the market
makers’ terminal risk tolerances
τm(a) ,
1
am(pim(a))
= −
u′m(pi
m(a))
u′′m(pi
m(a))
, m = 1, . . . ,M, a ∈ A,
and the aggregate terminal risk-tolerance
R1(a) ,
M∑
m=1
τm(a), a = (v, x, q) ∈ A.
Taking constant c > 0 from Assumption 2.2 we have
1
c
≤ τm(a) ≤ c, m = 1, . . . ,M, a ∈ A,
and then
M
c
≤ R1(a) ≤Mc, a ∈ A.
The latter estimate allows us to define a probability measure R(a) whose
density under Q(a) is given by
(4.8)
dR(a)
dQ(a)
,
1/R1(a)
EQ(a)[1/R1(a)]
, a ∈ A,
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as well as the initial aggregate risk-tolerance:
R0(a) , ER(a)[R1(a)], a ∈ A.
The terminology is due to the fact that R = (R0, R1) is the stochastic field
of risk-tolerances of the stochastic field F = (F0, F1) of aggregate utilities:
(4.9) Ri(a) = −
∂Fi
∂x
(a)/
∂2Fi
∂x2
(a), i = 1, 2;
see the discussion in [6] just before Lemma 4.8.
Finally, for a ∈ A, we define the matrices
Alm(a) =
1
R0(a)
{
δlmER(a)[τ
m(a)R1(a)]− CovR(a)[τ
l(a), τm(a)]
}
,(4.10)
Cmj(a) =
1
R0(a)
CovR(a)[τ
m(a), ψj ],(4.11)
Dij(a) =
1
R0(a)
CovR(a)[ψ
i, ψj ],(4.12)
where δlm = 1{l=m} is Kronecker’s delta, we let l, m = 1, . . . ,M and i, j =
1, . . . , J , and where
CovR[ξ, η] , ER[ξη]− ER[ξ]ER[η],
denotes the covariance of random variables ξ and η under a probability mea-
sure R. Lemma 4.8 in [6] shows that A(a) is strictly positive definite:
1
c
|z|2 ≤ 〈z, A(a)z〉 ≤ c |z|2 , z ∈ RM ,
where c > 0 is the constant from Assumption 2.2. In particular, the inverse
matrix A(a)−1 is well-defined.
Theorem 4.2. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 hold. Then the Pareto
weights w = w(q) are continuously differentiable, the market indifference
price x = x(q) is two-times continuously differentiable and, form = 1, . . . ,M ,
i, j = 1, . . . , J , and q ∈ RJ ,
Zmj(q) ,
1
wm
∂wm
∂qj
(q) = Emj(q)−
M∑
k=1
wk(q)Ekj(q),(4.13)
∂2x
∂qi∂qj
(q) = H ij(q),(4.14)
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where the matrices E = E(q) and H = H(q) have the expressions
E = −A−1C,(4.15)
H = CTA−1C +D,(4.16)
in terms of the matrices A , A(a(q)), C , C(a(q)), and D , D(a(q))
computed in (4.10), (4.11), and (4.12) at a(q) , (w(q), x(q), q).
The proof relies on the expressions below for the matrices A(a), C(a),
and D(a) in terms of the partial derivatives of F0. In the case of the matrix
A(a), such a formula is given in Lemma 4.8 of [6]:
Alm(v, x, q) =
vlvm
∂F0
∂x
(
∂2F0
∂vl∂vm
−
1
∂2F0
∂x2
∂2F0
∂vl∂x
∂2F0
∂vm∂x
)
(v, x, q).
The corresponding computations for the matrices C(a) and D(a) are done
in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4, the matrices C(a) and
D(a) defined by (4.11) and (4.12) can be written as
Cmj(v, x, q) =
vm
∂F0
∂x
(
∂2F0
∂vm∂qj
−
1
∂2F0
∂x2
∂2F0
∂vm∂x
∂2F0
∂x∂qj
)
(v, x, q),
Dij(v, x, q) =
1
∂F0
∂x
(
−
∂2F0
∂qi∂qj
+
1
∂2F0
∂x2
∂2F0
∂x∂qi
∂2F0
∂x∂qj
)
(v, x, q).
Proof. From the identities for the second derivatives of r = r(v, x) collected
in Theorem 3.2 of [6] we deduce the following expressions for second order
derivatives of F1(a) = r(v,Σ(x, q)):
vm
∂2F1
∂vm∂x
(a) = −
∂2F1
∂x2
(a)τm(a),
vm
∂2F1
∂vm∂qj
(a) = −
∂2F1
∂x2
(a)τm(a)ψj,
∂2F1
∂x∂qj
(a) =
∂2F1
∂x2
(a)ψj ,
∂2F1
∂qi∂qj
(a) =
∂2F1
∂x2
(a)ψiψj .
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By Theorem 4.2 in [6], the function F0 = F0(a) is twice continuously differen-
tiable and its second order derivatives are expectations of the corresponding
derivatives for F1 = F1(a):
∂2F0
∂ai∂aj
(a) = E[
∂2F1
∂ai∂aj
(a)].
The result now follows by direct computations if we account for the identi-
ties (4.9) for Ri(a), i = 1, 2 and the expression
dR(a)
dP
,
∂2F1
∂x2
(a)/
∂2F0
∂x2
(a),
for the density of R(a) under P.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Theorem 4.2 in [6] implies that G0 = G0(a) is twice
continuously differentiable. In view of the representations (4.5), for w(q),
and (4.6), for x(q), we obtain that w = w(q) is continuously differentiable
and x = x(q) is twice continuously differentiable. We also deduce that the
identities (4.13) and (4.14) hold with the matrices E(q) and H(q) such that
Emj(q) =
1
∂G0
∂um
(U0, 1, q)
∂2G0
∂um∂qj
(U0, 1, q),
H ij(q) =
∂2G0
∂qi∂qj
(U0, 1, q),
where m = 1, . . . ,M and i, j = 1, . . . , J . The fact that these matrices can
be computed by (4.15) and (4.16) is proved in Theorems 4.2 and 2.10 of [6]
in the situation where the matrices A(a), C(a), and D(a) have the above
expressions in terms of F0.
4.2 Asymptotic expansions for market indifference prices
To facilitate the economic interpretation of the sensitivities given in Theo-
rem 4.1 let us compute the second-order expansion for the market indifference
prices x = x(q) with respect to the order size q. Some additional notations
are needed. For a random variable ξ and a probability measure R denote
VarR[ξ] , CovR[ξ, ξ],
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the variance of ξ under R. For vectors µ ∈ SM and z ∈ RM we shall use a
similar notation:
Varµ[z] ,
M∑
i=1
µi(zi)2 − (
M∑
i=1
µizi)2
interpreted as the variance of the random variable z defined on the sample
space {1, . . . ,M} with respect to the probability measure µ. For a ∈ A
define ρ(a) ∈ L0(SM), the vector of relative risk-tolerance weights, by
(4.17) ρm(a) ,
τm(a)∑M
k=1 τ
k(a)
=
τm(a)
R1(a)
, m = 1, . . . ,M.
Theorem 4.4. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4, the second-order ex-
pansion for the market indifference prices x = x(q) with respect to the order
q ∈ RJ can be written as
x(q +∆q)− x(q) = −EQ[〈∆q, ψ〉] +
R0
2
ER
[(
dQ
dR
)2
Varρ[Z∆q]
]
+
1
2R0
{(
CovR[
dQ
dR
, 〈∆q, ψ〉]
)2
+VarR[〈∆q, ψ〉]
}
+ o(|∆q|2), ∆q → 0,
(4.18)
where Z = Z(q) is defined in (4.13) and where we omitted the argument
a(q) = (w(q), x(q), q).
Proof. The linear term in (4.18) follows from (4.7). To verify the second-
order part we decompose the matrix A = A(a(q)) from (4.10) as
A = R0(S + ss
T ),
where, for l, m = 1, . . . ,M ,
Slm ,
1
R20
ER[τ
l(δlm
M∑
k=1
τk − τm)],
sl ,
1
R0
ER[τ
l].
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Denote 1 , (1, . . . , 1) ∈ RM and observe that
S1 = (1TS)T = 0,(4.19)
〈s, 1〉 =
1
R0
ER[
M∑
k=1
τk] =
1
R0
ER[R1] = 1.(4.20)
Let E = E(q) andH = H(q) be the matrices defined by (4.15) and (4.16).
Using the fact that A = AT we can write H as
H = ETAE +D.
By Theorem 4.2, H = H(q) is the Hessian matrix for x = x(q). Hence, the
second-order part in the expansion of x(q+∆q)−x(q) with respect to ∆q is
given by
1
2
〈∆q,H∆q〉 =
1
2
〈E∆q, AE∆q〉+
1
2
〈∆q,D∆q〉
=
R0
2
〈E∆q, SE∆q〉+
R0
2
(〈E∆q, s〉)2 +
1
2
〈∆q,D∆q〉 .
Since, by (4.13), (E − Z)∆q is the product of some scalar on the vector 1,
(4.19) implies that 〈E∆q, SE∆q〉 = 〈Z∆q, SZ∆q〉. Observe that, in view of
(4.8), the matrix S can be written as
Slm =
1
R20
ER[R
2
1ρ
l(δlm − ρ
m)] = ER[
(
dQ
dR
)2
ρl(δlm − ρ
m)].
It follows that
〈Z∆q, SZ∆q〉 = ER[
(
dQ
dR
)2
Varρ[Z∆q]],
giving the first quadratic term in (4.18).
By (4.15), 〈1, (AE + C)∆q〉 = 0, which, in view of (4.19) and (4.20),
implies that
R0 〈s, E∆q〉+ 〈1, C∆q〉 = 0.
From the construction of C in (4.11) and accounting again for (4.8) we deduce
the second quadratic term in (4.18):
〈s, E∆q〉 = −
1
R0
〈1, C∆q〉 = −
1
R20
CovR[R1, 〈∆q, ψ〉]
= −
1
R0
CovR[
dQ
dR
, 〈∆q, ψ〉].
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Finally, the expression (4.12) for D yields the last term:
〈∆q,D∆q〉 =
1
R0
VarR[〈∆q, ψ〉].
Observe that the linear term in (4.18) corresponds to the “standard”
model of mathematical finance, where a “small” investor can trade any
number of securities ψ at “fixed” or exogenous prices EQ[ψ]. The second,
quadratic, component can thus be viewed as a price impact correction to
this model. Note that all three terms of the quadratic part are non-negative
and the last term, VarR[〈∆q, ψ〉], equals zero iff 〈∆q, ψ〉 = const. Hence,
for any non-trivial transaction our large investor will have to pay a strictly
positive penalty due to his price impact in comparison with a hypothetical
small agent trading at EQ[ψ].
To get a further insight into the microstructure of our model we provide
still another second-order expansion of x = x(q) along with the first-order
expansion of the post-trade Pareto allocations pi = pi(q) , pi(a(q)). We
introduce probability measures Rm(a), m = 1, . . . ,M , such that
dRm(a)
dQ(a)
,
1/τm(a)
EQ(a)[1/τm(a)]
, m = 1, . . . ,M, a ∈ A;
they are analogs of R(a) for individual market makers. We shall also make
use of the random matrix ζ = ζ(a) given, for a ∈ A, by
(4.21) ζmj(a) , R1(a)ρ
m(a)
(
Emj(a)−
M∑
l=1
ρl(a)Elj(a)
)
,
where m = 1, . . . ,M , j = 1, . . . , J , and the matrix E = E(a) is defined
in (4.15). We denote by ζm the mth row of ζ and observe that
(4.22)
M∑
m=1
ζm = 0.
Theorem 4.5. Under Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4, the first-order expan-
sion, in the almost sure sense, of the Pareto optimal allocations pi = pi(q) ,
pi(a(q)) is given by
pim(q +∆q)− pi(q) =ρm (〈ψ,∆q〉 − EQ[〈ψ,∆q〉]) + 〈ζ
m,∆q〉
+ o(|∆q|2), ∆q → 0, m = 1, . . . ,M,
(4.23)
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and the second-order expansion for the market indifference prices x = x(q)
can be written as
x(q +∆q)− x(q) =− EQ[〈∆q, ψ〉]
+
1
2
{
EQ[1/R1]ER
[
〈ψ − EQ[ψ],∆q〉
2]
+
M∑
m=1
EQ[1/τ
m]ERm
[
〈ζm,∆q〉2
]}
+ o(|∆q|2), ∆q → 0,
(4.24)
where we omitted the argument a(q) = (w(q), x(q), q).
Proof. To verify (4.23) recall that if x̂m = x̂m(v, x), m = 1, . . . ,M , is the
argmax vector in the construction of the aggregate utility:
r(v, x) , sup
x1+···+xM=x
M∑
m=1
vmum(x
m) =
M∑
m=1
vmum(x̂
m),
then its partial derivatives are given by
∂x̂m
∂x
(v, x) =
tm(x̂
m)∑M
k=1 tk(x̂
k)
,
vl
∂x̂m
∂vl
(v, x) = vm
∂x̂l
∂vm
(v, x) = tm(x̂
m)
(
δlm −
tl(x̂
l)∑M
k=1 tk(x̂
k)
)
,
see, e.g., Theorem 3.2 in [6], where
tm(x) ,
1
am(x)
= −
u′m(x)
u′′m(x)
, x ∈ R, m = 1, . . . ,M,
are the market makers’ risk-tolerances. It follows that, for a = (v, x, q),
∂pim
∂x
(a) = ρm(a),
∂pim
∂qj
(a) = ρm(a)ψj,
vl
∂pim
∂vl
(a) = R1(a)ρ
m(a)
(
δlm − ρ
l(a)
)
.
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Combining these identities with (4.7) and (4.13) and omitting, as usual, the
argument a(q) = (w(q), x(q), q) we obtain
∂
∂qj
pim(q) = ρm
∂x(q)
∂qj
+ ρmψj +R1(a)ρ
m(a)
M∑
l=1
(
δlm − ρ
l(a)
) 1
wl(q)
∂wl(q)
∂qj
= ρm(−EQ[ψ
j ]) + ρmψj
+R1(a)ρ
m(a)
M∑
l=1
(
δlm − ρ
l(a)
)(
Elj(q)−
M∑
k=1
wk(q)Ekj(q)
)
= ρm(ψj − EQ[ψ
j]) + ζmj,
which yields (4.23).
To verify the second-order expansion (4.24) for x = x(q) we shall match
its terms with those of (4.18). Recall that dQ/dR = R1/R0 and observe that
for a random variable ξ
ER[(ξ − EQ[ξ])
2 = ER[(ξ − ER[ξ])
2 + (ER[ξ]− EQ[ξ])
2
= VarR[ξ] +
(
CovR[
dQ
dR
, ξ]
)2
.
This shows that the second term in (4.24) coincides with the sum of the last
two terms in (4.18).
If now η = (ηm)m=1,...,M is a vector of random variables such that 〈ρ, η〉 =∑M
m=1 ρ
mηm = 0, then
M∑
m=1
EQ[1/τ
m]ERm [(τ
mηm)2] =
M∑
m=1
EQ[τ
m(ηm)2]
= R0
M∑
m=1
ER
[(
dQ
dR
)2
ρm(ηm)2
]
= R0ER
[(
dQ
dR
)2
Varρ[η]
]
.
Choosing
ηm =
1
τm
〈ζm,∆q〉 , m = 1, . . . ,M,
we deduce from (4.22) that 〈ρ, η〉 = 0 and then from (4.21) and (4.13) that
η = E∆q + z11 = Z∆q + z21,
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where 1 = {1, . . . , 1} and z1 and z2 are some constants. It follows that
Varρ[η] = Varρ[E∆q] = Varρ[Z∆q],
proving the equality between the third term in (4.24) and the second term
in (4.18).
The expansion (4.23) shows that the market makers share the extra en-
dowment 〈ψ − EQ[ψ],∆q〉 in proportion to their individual risk tolerances
and, in addition, make zero-sum trades 〈ζm,∆q〉, m = 1, . . . ,M , between
themselves; see (4.22). As the expansion (4.24) reveals, the liquidity pre-
mium arises from both these components.
It is quite common in the economic literature to replace a collection of
economic agents with a single, representative, agent whose utility function is
given by r(w, ·), with r = r(v, x) from (3.1), for some fixed weight w ∈ SM .
In our case, this simplification yields the linear term in (4.24) as well as
the first component of the quadratic part, but not the remaining ones. It
is interesting to obtain conditions for the second term of the quadratic part
in (4.24) or, equivalently, the second term in (4.18) to vanish, since, then,
the representative agent approximation leads to the identical expression for
the price impact coefficient as our original model with many market makers.
This is accomplished in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.6. Let the conditions of Theorem 4.4 hold and take q,∆q ∈ RJ .
Then the following assertions are equivalent:
1. ERm
[
〈ζm,∆q〉2
]
= 0, m = 1, . . . ,M .
2. ER
[(
dQ
dR
)2
Varρ[Z(q)∆q]
]
= 0;
3. Z(q)∆q = 0;
4. EQm [〈∆q, ψ〉] = EQ[〈∆q, ψ〉], m = 1, . . . ,M ,
where, for a ∈ A,
dQm(a)
dQ(a)
,
ρm(a)
EQ[ρm(a)]
, m = 1, . . . ,M,
and we omitted the argument a(q) , (w(q), x(q), q).
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Proof. 1 ⇐⇒ 2: This follows from the equality:
M∑
m=1
EQ[1/τ
m]ERm
[
〈ζm,∆q〉2
]
= R0ER
[(
dQ
dR
)2
Varρ[Z∆q]
]
which was part of the proof of Theorem 4.5.
2 ⇐⇒ 3: Clearly, item 2 holds if and only if Varρ[Z(q)∆q] = 0, which, in
turn, is equivalent to Z(q)∆q = y1 for some y ∈ R. From the construction
of the matrix Z(q) in (4.13) we deduce that 〈w(q), Z(q)∆q〉 = 0, where the
Pareto weights w(q) take values in SM . It follows that y = 0.
3 ⇐⇒ 4: Denote ξ , 〈∆q, ψ〉 ∈ L0(R). From the definition of the
measures Qm, m = 1, . . . ,M , we deduce the equivalence of item 4 to
(4.25) EQm [ξ] = EQ1[ξ], m = 2, . . . ,M.
From (4.13) we deduce that Z(q)∆q = 0 if and only if E∆q = y1 for some y ∈
R, where the matrix E = E(q) satisfies (4.15). Hence, item 3 is equivalent
to the existence of a constant y ∈ R such that
(4.26) yA1+ C∆q = 0,
From the expressions (4.10) and (4.11) for the matrices A = A(a(q)) and
C = C(a(q)) we obtain
(A1)m = ER[τ
m] = R0EQ[ρ
m],
(C∆q)m =
1
R0
CovR[τ
m, ξ] =
1
R0
(ER[τ
mξ]− ER[τ
m]ER[ξ])
= EQ[ρ
m] (EQm [ξ]− ER[ξ]) , m = 1, . . . ,M,
which clearly implies the equivalence of (4.25) and (4.26).
The condition of item 4 is clearly satisfied when the random weights ρ
defined in (4.17) are deterministic. This is the case, for instance, if all market
makers have exponential utilities: um(x) = − exp(−amx), with constant risk-
aversion am > 0, m = 1, . . . ,M . Moreover, if the securities ψ form a complete
model in the sense that, jointly with the constant security paying 1 they span
all random variables, than the validity of item 4 for any ∆q ∈ RJ is in fact
equivalent to ρ being deterministic.
27
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